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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The use of emergency lights and sirens as warning devices by 
ambulances is a hotly debated topic within the Emergency Medical Services. For 
the last few decades, research has shown that lights and sirens have only a 
minimal effect on time required to transport patients to the hospital, and 
essentially no positive effect on patient outcome. Meanwhile, thousands of 
ambulance crashes occur every year (usually during the operation of lights and 
sirens), and its possible that’s tens of thousands of crashes are occurring as a 
result of a passing ambulance, though not directly involving the ambulance itself. 
 This paper is meant to provide a thorough review of the science behind 
the use of lights and sirens, the risks they pose to EMS providers, patients, and 
the public, and strategies to help curb they cost they pose both in dollars and 
lives. The available literature on this subject all points to the use of lights ad 
 
 
vi 
sirens being out dated, ineffective, and dangerous, and yet almost nothing has 
been done to solve the problems they cause. Continued research and 
development is needed to help make ambulances safer for their occupants, more 
effective driver training programs need to be offered to EMS providers, and 
protocols need to be adopted to limit the unnecessary use of L&S.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Whenever a medical emergency occurs outside of a hospital, 911 is called 
and an ambulance is sent to the scene. The public has a reasonable expectation 
that the ambulance will arrive in a short amount of time, and that they will be 
safely taken care of by the Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs). However, 
every year thousands of ambulances either never arrive at the scene, or to the 
hospital due to being involved in motor vehicle accidents, many of which are 
fatal. For decades the effectiveness and necessity of flashing lights and sirens 
has been called into question, and yet very little reform has been put into place. It 
has been estimated that less than 5% of ambulance transports medically require 
the use of lights and sirens.17  
 There are multiple factors that play into the use of lights and sirens, all of 
which must be considered together to form a policy for their use. The first is their 
effectiveness as far as decreasing dispatch to scene (response) time, and scene 
to hospital (transport) time. It is important to differentiate between these two time 
periods when discussing L&S use, as in most cases it is much more important for 
response time to be shortened rather than transport time. This is because prior to 
EMS’ arrival on scene, there is usually no healthcare professional there to care 
for the patient, and also limited information on the nature of said patient’s 
injury/illness. Once EMS has arrived on scene, critical patient care can begin, 
and the patient can be stabilized, possibly decreasing the need for a fast 
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transport time to the hospital. For instance, in the case of Ventricular Fibrillation 
(a type of cardiac arrhythmia in which the patient is in cardiac arrest), the chance 
of successfully reviving the patient decreases by 10% for each minute that 
defibrillation is delayed.12 Defibrillation is a procedure that EMS providers can 
perform immediately upon arrival at an emergency scene. Obviously in some 
situations transport will always need to be expedited (uncontrolled hemorrhage, 
acute myocardial infarction (AMI), stroke, etc.), but EMTs and Paramedics can 
effectively treat (or at least stabilize) most medical emergencies prior to arriving 
at the hospital. Multiple studies have shown that the use of lights and sirens 
(especially in urban settings) does decrease response and transport time, 
although as previously discussed, such a decrease is not necessary in the vast 
majority of EMS responses. A study conducted in Syracuse, NY found that the 
use of lights and sirens reduced response time by an average of 1 minute, 46 
seconds. However, they noted in their conclusion that this difference was only 
clinically relevant in a minority of cases.4 
The issue of faster response and transport time is closely linked with the 
effect of lights and sirens on patient outcome. Unfortunately, there is not nearly 
as much information available on L&S usage’s effect on patient outcome as there 
is on its effect on response time. This is because it is much harder to gauge 
whether the 1 minute, 46 seconds that is saved on average (in the study 
previously discussed) truly makes a difference in patient outcome. It has been 
shown that as the speed of ambulance transport increases, the effectiveness of 
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closed-chest compressions (as part of CPR) is decreased.6 In this specific 
example, higher speeds would clearly have a negative effect on patient care, as 
the most current AHA guidelines state that effective compressions are one of the 
most important parts of cardiac arrest care.24 
The third, and arguably most important, issue pertaining to the use of 
lights and sirens is their effect on the safety of EMS workers, patients, and the 
general public. An estimated 6,500 ambulance crashes occur every year in the 
US,29 causing $500 million worth of damage.2 A study of fatal ambulance crashes 
in the United States showed that 60% of them occurred during warning signal 
use, and while going through an intersection (53%). The majority of fatalities 
were of the public, not occupants in the ambulance.14 
 
 
II. AIM 
 
This paper aims to provide a thorough review of the procedures in place 
for the use of lights and sirens, their effect on patient outcome, and the risk that 
their use poses to the safety of EMS (Emergency Medical Service) providers and 
the general public. Although the main subject of discussion will be use of lights 
and sirens, some closely related subjects such as driver behavior, ambulance 
safety, and patient care will be touched on.  
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III. PUBLISHED STUDIES 
  
There are relatively few published studies on the various aspects of 
warning signal usage by emergency vehicles. Most of the available studies focus 
on the time saved by using them during response and/or transport, the more 
quantitative side of this topic. Studies focusing on lights and sirens effect on the 
general public and EMS providers are quite sparse, and rarer still are articles 
discussing their effect on patient outcome. These three subjects will be 
discussed separately within this section.  
 
 
A. Effect on Ambulance Response and Transport Times 
 
As previously stated, there have been multiple studies published regarding 
the effectiveness of lights and sirens on decreasing response/transport time. 
Essentially all of these studies found that the use of lights and sirens did reduce 
response/transport times by a statistically significant amount, though to varying 
degrees across the different studies. Where the studies differ is during their 
discussion of whether the timed saved is clinically significant, with the majority 
concluding that it was not.  
 
 
5 
One of the studies took place in the urban environment of Minneapolis, 
MN (population: 378,000). The results of the study showed an average of 3.02 
minutes saved when lights and sirens were activated.12 This study measured the 
time it took for the ambulance to reach the emergency following receipt of the 
911 call, referred to as the response time. One issue with the methods utilized in 
this study is that they obtained their non-warning signal response times by using 
a chase car to follow the vehicle utilizing the lights and sirens, instead of 
reproducing the route at a later time. This could cause the chase car to be 
affected by a phenomenon called the “wake effect”.  The wake effect is the term 
used to describe the events caused by the passage of an emergency vehicle 
utilizing lights and sirens as it passes through traffic – i.e. vehicles pulling to the 
side of the road, vehicles moving through red lights, etc. This phenomenon could 
easily result in the slowing of the chase car following the ambulance, which the 
authors of the study did acknowledge.12 Interestingly enough, the wake effect has 
also been show to cause a large amount of accidents itself, that is, accidents 
caused by the passing of the emergency vehicle, but not actually involving the 
emergency vehicle.7 This information falls under the umbrella of lights and siren 
use’s effect on the general public, and will be discussed in greater detail later in 
this paper.  
A study conducted in Greenville, NC (population: 46,000 at the time 
research was conducted,1994) attempted to compare the transport time (the time 
from leaving the scene with the patient to arriving at the ED) of ambulances using 
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lights and sirens to those not. The results of said study showed an average time 
saved when using lights and sirens of 43.5 seconds. The authors concluded that 
although this was a statistically significant time period, it was not clinically 
significant. They argued that there are very few situations in which such a short 
time period would impact a patient’s clinical outcome.13 The methods applied to 
this study varied from those in the previous one discussed, which recorded non-
warning signal response times by following the ambulance with a “chase car”. In 
this study, the team waited until all of the emergency runs had been completed 
and recorded, and then recreated them by having a paramedic from the same 
EMS department drive an ambulance without lights and sirens along the same 
route. All of the runs were conducted at the same time of day,  +/- 5 minutes, and 
on the same day of the week.13 In using this method, the researchers ensured 
that the “wake effect” would not effect their results. They did note that there was 
a discrepancy between the amount of light (day, night, dusk) during the calls, due 
to a change from Daylight Savings Time to Eastern Standard Time prior to the 
non-emergency times being recorded (Table 1). They posited that this actually 
would have increased the amount of time that the non-emergency vehicles took 
to reach the hospital (due to low visibility) and possibly increased the 43.5 
second average difference between the two groups.13 
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Table 1: Discrepancies in Light Conditions.* 
 
 
*(L&S: Lights and Sirens). This table shows the differences between the amount 
of light/visibility during the emergency vs. non-emergency transports due to the loss of 
Daylight Savings Time. Although the point in the day at which the calls were conducted 
is different, the exact time is the same, +/- 5 minutes.13 
 
 
A similar study to the one previous discussed in Greenville was conducted 
a few years later in Syracuse, NY (population: 170,000 at the research was 
conducted, 1999). The methods used to record the emergency vs. non-
emergency runs were the same (conducting the non-emergency runs at a later 
date on the identical route, at the same time and same day of the week). They 
also eliminated any calls that occurred during any sort of major traffic altering 
event such as road construction, or calls that included multiple responding 
vehicles, so as to not have the data skewed by the wake effect. The two main 
differences were the location (population of 170,000 vs. 46,000) and that the 
response time was record as opposed to the transport time. In this study, it was 
found that the use of lights and sirens saved an average of 1 minute, 46 seconds 
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over responses that were conducted in a non-emergency fashion.4 Although the 
majority of the runs were faster when using lights and sirens, a few were the 
opposite, and in general there was a linear relationship between the two times 
(Figure 1).  
The authors referenced the Minneapolis study, in which a mean difference 
in response time of 3.02 minutes was found. They stated they felt the methods 
used in said study were flawed, mostly because of the chase car being subjected 
to the wake effect, a fact that has already been discussed in this paper. They 
also suggested that the public may respond differently to an ambulance as 
opposed to a regular vehicle (i.e. stopping to allow the ambulance to make a left 
turn, letting it out into traffic, etc.), even when the ambulance is not using its lights 
and sirens.4 The authors also noted that a large limitation in all three studies was 
the small sample sizes, as well as the relatively small population of the 
geographical locations in which they were conducted. They stated that a large-
scale study conducted in various locations (specifically large cities such as New 
York and Chicago) was needed in the future to produce more valuable results.4 
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Figure 1: Response times to incidents both with and without the use of lights and 
sirens (in seconds). It can be seen that most incidents had a faster response time with 
the use of lights and sirens, but in general there is a linear relation between the two 
times.4 
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 A more recent study aimed to not only measure the difference in time 
saved when transporting with L&S, but its effect on the patient’s outcome. The 
study will be discussed in more detail later in this paper, however it is worth 
noting now the study found that an average of 2.62 minutes were saved when 
transporting with L&S activated.22 The study was conducted in a New Jersey 
county with a population of around 800,000. Although the average time saved 
with L&S usage was greater than that found in the Syracuse study, a generally 
linear correlation was again found between the two times (Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2. Transport times with and without the use of lights and sirens (in 
minutes). This graph shows that although most transport times were faster with L&S 
usage (represented by points above the solid line), there again remained a generally 
linear correlation between the two data points.22 
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B. Effect on EMS Provider/Public Safety 
 
Perhaps the most important aspect of lights and siren usage is its effect 
on the safety of EMS providers and the general public. The number of 
emergency vehicle collisions (EVCs) that occur every year is astounding, as is 
the number of fatalities associated with them. A research study from 2010 aimed 
to evaluate characteristics of EVCs over a period of two years. The authors 
stated that there is no national database that specifically records ambulance 
accidents, and thus they gathered their data from a website called EMSNetwork 
that compiles reports of ambulance crashes in the United States from the media. 
It should be noted that a possible limitation of this study is that the EVCs reported 
by the media may tend to be those that are more serious in nature, as opposed 
to minor accidents. The study analyzed 466 EVCs during the two year time 
period, resulting in 982 injuries (more than two per accident) and 99 fatalities 
(approximately one fatality for every five accidents).29 EMS providers were the 
most often injured persons in the crash, as opposed to the patient being 
transported or the general public. However, the general public accounted for 
most of the fatalities (65%) (Figure 3). The patient being transported was the 
least often injured (although more patients were killed than EMS providers, 19 
and 14, respectively).  
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Figure 3. Comparison of injured and killed persons. Injured or killed persons 
in the 466 EVCs analyzed were placed into these three categories. It should be noted 
that although EMTs were the most often injured, they made up the smallest portion of 
fatalities.29 
 
 
 
A study published in 2000 retrospectively analyzed all fatal EVCs in the 
United States over an 11 year period. During the time period, 339 fatal 
ambulance crashes occurred, resulting in 405 fatalities and 838 injuries.15 Data 
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was obtained from the United States NHTSA Fatal Accident Reporting System 
(FARS). The results identified intersections as the most probable location for a 
fatal accident to occur (53%). When considering how little time is spent traveling 
through intersections as opposed to the open road, this statistic becomes even 
more significant. As far as emergency vs. non-emergency operation, 60% of 
accidents and 58% of fatalities occurred during L&S use. Accidents involving 
L&S use were also far more likely to occur at intersections than those in which 
L&S were not activated.15 78% of fatalities were not occupants of the ambulance 
(EMS providers, patients, or their families). This statistic somewhat aligns with 
the 65% of fatalities reported in the study previously discussed.  
The study also noted stark differences between the characteristics of fatal 
accidents involving ambulances, and those involving only the general public. 
Fatal accidents involving ambulances were more likely to involve more than one 
vehicle, occur at an angle, and at intersections (Table 2). However, the 
percentage of accidents that were roll-overs was nearly identical between those 
involving ambulances and those involving the general public, even though 
ambulances are known to be more top-heavy than most passenger cars.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
Table 2. Crash Configurations in General vs. Ambulance Accidents.  
 
 
*This table shows the differences in crash configurations between accidents 
involving the general public and ambulances. It should be noted that the data for the 
general public is from one year only, 1997, while the data for ambulances crashes 
spanned the entire 11 year study. Because of this, the percentages in each category are 
much more important than the actual number of crashes (n).15 
 
 
 
  
Another interesting aspect of the retrospective study was the collection of 
data on the driving record of EMS providers involved in the fatal accidents. Kahn, 
et. al. noted various aspects of the driving history of the provider who was listed 
as driving at the time of the accident, including prior citations, prior crashes, and 
prior DWIs. These values were then compared with the general public (Table 3).  
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Table 3. Driving Histories in Ambulance vs. General Public Crashes.* 
 
 
*This graph illustrates the differences between EMS providers and the general 
public involved in crashes when it comes to driving histories. Again, note that the data 
for the general public comes only from 1997, while the data from EMS providers spans 
the entire 11 year study.15 
 
 
The category of “High-Risk Driver” in Table 3 attempts to compile all of the 
categories into one statistic. Although the percentage of EMS providers given this 
designation approximately matches that of the general public, the authors note 
that since EMS providers are involved with promoting public safety, it is not 
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unreasonable to expect them to be held to a higher safety standard.15 Other 
papers have stated that drivers should have their records screened prior to being 
allowed to operate with L&S.25 Custalow and Gravitz reviewed data on EVCs in 
Denver, CO over an eight year period and found that in 71% of the collisions, the 
driver of the ambulance had a history of multiple prior EVCs.10 They also noted 
that 91% of EVCs occurred during L&S use, while only 75% of all transports were 
listed as using L&S. A separate study conducted over a year in Houston, TX 
analyzed 86 EVCs. The results showed that of all the crashes, five drivers, all 
with prior history of EVCs, were responsible for nearly 90% of the injuries that 
resulted as a result of the 86 ECVs.3 Saunders and Heye analyzed crash data in 
San Francisco over a 27 month period and found that collisions were more likely 
to occur during L&S use than non-use (45.9 collisions/100,000 L&S transports 
and 27.0 collisions/100,000 non L&S transports), but the difference was not 
statistically significant.30 However, the injury rate as a result of said crashes was 
statistically significant, with rates of 22.2 injuries/100,000 L&S transports and 
1.5/100,000 non-L&S transports.30  
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1. EMS Provider Safety 
 
EVCs pose a major threat to safety of EMS providers, especially those 
providing patient care in the rear compartment.15 A study was conducted to 
review the occupational fatalities of EMS providers between 1992 and 1997. The 
results showed an fatality rate of 12.7 per 100,000 EMS providers annually.5 This 
closely compared to fatality rates for police and firefighters during the same time 
period, which were 14.2 and 16.5, respectively.21 The national average fatality 
rate was 5.0 at the time of the study, less than half that of EMS providers. There 
were 91 total fatalities, 67 of which (74%) were caused by crashes. 10 (11%) 
were caused by assaults, and 14 (15%) were listed as other.21  
A comprehensive review of the occupational hazards that pose a threat to 
EMS providers was published in 2008. The authors grouped the hazards facing 
EMTs into three distinct categories: Increased Risk of EVCs, Poor Ambulance 
Safety Designs, and Injury While Delivering Critical Patient Care (Figure 4).31 So 
far, most of the issues discussed in this paper fall under the umbrella of 
increased risk of EVCs, however, it is pertinent to discuss the safety design of 
ambulances, as well as injuries that occur as a result of delivering patient care. 
As was previously discussed, the majority of injuries to EMS providers occur to 
those providing care in the rear compartment.15 
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 Figure 4. Risk-Factors pertaining to EMS Provider injury during patient 
transport. This graphic outlines the three categories into which hazards to EMS provider 
safety can be placed. Note that “sterile cockpit” as mentioned in the first category means 
that the front compartment is free of any object which could distract the driver, such as 
cell phones.31 
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 The design of ambulances makes them inherently dangerous to travel in, 
especially in the rear compartment. The odds of sustaining a serious injury or 
fatality in the rear compartment are 2.7 times higher than the front 
compartment.15  The rear compartment is essentially a hospital emergency room 
traveling down the road at highway speeds. It is filled with hundreds of pieces of 
medical equipment, including large duffel bags and cardiac monitors (a standard 
LIFEPAK Cardiac Monitor weighs 16.5 pounds).28 There is also a patient and 
anywhere from one to three EMS providers in the rear, who are often not 
restrained. In the event of a crash, all of this equipment (and the personnel) 
become deadly projectiles. The rear compartment also has many cabinets that 
project out into the space creating sharp corners which are often located near the 
provider’s heads.31 The United States also has very poor safety standards for 
ambulances, in fact, there are no standards for crash testing or crash worthiness 
of ambulances.31 The review article stated that this is not the case everywhere in 
the world, New Zealand and Australia both have very strict standards for 
ambulance design safety.31 However, the authors did note that it is unknown 
whether or not these comprehensive standards have any effect on EMS provider 
safety.  
The third category of risk factors is injury while providing patient care. The 
previously outlined design flaws in the rear compartment of ambulances are 
compounded by the fact that EMS providers are often unable to remain 
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restrained in the rear compartment while providing patient care, especially to 
critical patients. The large size of the rear compartment (causing providers to 
have to stand and reach for equipment), the need to stand for certain procedures 
(CPR), and special situations such as combative patients all contribute to the 
lack of restraint use by providers. A survey of 1,200 providers in 1991 showed 
that even though 76% of providers believed seatbelts were very helpful in crash 
situations, only 3.2% stated that they wore them for the entirety of emergency 
transports when providing patient care.18 In a separate study, EMS providers 
reported needing to be unrestrained 70% of the time when transporting critically 
ill or injured patients (Table 4).9 The issue of seatbelt use is so important 
because it is one of the biggest factors in reducing the chance of serious injuries 
or fatalities should an EVC occur. A study showed that even though unrestrained 
providers in the rear compartment accounted for 12% of all persons involved in 
EVCs, they made up 52% of fatalities, and 44% of serious injuries1. This statistic 
closely matches the percentage of non-ambulance crash related fatalities that did 
not use a restraint, 54%.26 
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Table 4. Time Spent Unrestrained During Transport.* 
 
 
 
 
 
*This table demonstrates both the time spent unrestrained during various medical 
emergencies, as well at the percentage of emergencies which result in the provider 
being unrestrained for the entire course of transport. Data was gathered from providers 
after completing emergency calls.9, 31 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 Studies using crash test dummies also showed that being unrestrained in 
the patient compartment during an accident is extremely dangerous.19 One of the 
tests showed that a frontal crash at 30mph (with one unrestrained dummy and 
three restrained) resulted in the unrestrained dummy in the patient compartment 
becoming airborne and striking its head on a cabinet before landing head-first on 
the stretcher.19 The authors stated that the unrestrained dummy not only would 
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have been serious injured, but also posed a threat to the three restrained 
dummy, as it acted as a projectile during the crash.19 
The most often cited reason for non-seatbelt use was patient care being 
inhibited.17 As shown in Table 4, a patient in cardiac arrest resulted in the most 
time spent unrestrained during transport. This is due to the need for providers to 
perform Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) during transport. CPR cannot be 
performed from a seated position, due to the fact that it requires the provider to 
perform chest compressions at a rate of 100/minute with a force of upwards of 
100 pounds.31 Because of this, providers performing CPR are usually standing in 
the moving ambulance, and have their hands occupied, and are therefore unable 
to steady themselves by holding on to anything within the patient compartment. 
Accelerations and decelerations that occur during regular driving can cause a 
standing occupant to lose their balance and potentially injure themselves.11 
Slattery and colleagues liken it to attempting to stand on a bus or subway without 
the benefit of constantly holding onto a handle or railing.31 This issue becomes 
even worse when attempting to stand in an ambulance that is traveling with lights 
and sirens, as that usually translates to more aggressive driving, with unexpected 
accelerations, decelerations, and turns. It is also important to note that 
aggressive emergency driving can cause providers to fall and be injured even if 
no collision occurs. New technologies have been developed to keep providers in 
a seated, restrained position, such as automated chest compression machines 
(Figure 5).  
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 Figure 5. Providers caring for a simulated cardiac arrest patient during L&S 
travel on a closed course. The two pictures here clearly illustrate the positive 
difference that utilizing automated technology makes in regard to provider safety. Note 
the sharp and projecting edges throughout the patient compartment.31 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5A shows the traditional method of caring for a cardiac arrest 
patient – manual chest compressions and manual ventilation. One provider is 
able to be seated and restrained, but still has his hands occupied and thus 
cannot use them to brace himself. Figure 5B shows new technologies being put 
to use – automated chest compressions and automated ventilations. These 
machines allow consistent care to be delivered to the patient, and allow the 
providers to hold on to hand rails and remained seated and restrained. This also 
has a positive effect on patient outcome, which will be discussed later.  
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2. General Public Safety  
 
 
 The effect of L&S use on the safety of the general public is clearly 
demonstrated by the excessive number of EVCs that occur every year. A study 
of fatal ambulance crashes found that the ambulance was the striking vehicle in 
over 76% of crashes.15 Of those, over 60% occurred during L&S use.15 This 
statistic alone shows that ambulance crashes pose a threat to the general public, 
but studies have demonstrated that L&S use has an even more profound effect 
on public safety due to a seldom discussed phenomenon called the wake effect. 
The wake effect has been talked about for decades among EMS providers, and 
was initially based solely on anecdotal evidence. The phenomenon refers to 
accidents that are caused by the passage of an ambulance utilizing L&S, but not 
actually involving the ambulance.7 A study was conducted in 1997 to define the 
true scope of the wake effect. Paramedics from Salt Lake City, Utah and Salt 
Lake County were asked to complete a survey regarding EVCs and wake-effect 
crashes. The results showed that the mean number of EVCs per respondent was 
0.82 (0.86 in Salt Lake City, and 0.80 in Salt Lake County). The mean number of 
wake-effect collisions per provider was 3.49 (4.59 in Salt Lake City, and 2.79 in 
Salt Lake County).7 This means that in the urban environment of Salt Lake City, 
wake-effect collisions occurred at a rate five times higher than actual EVCs. The 
number of EVCs that occur every year in the United States is estimated to be 
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6,500.29 If the data found in Salt Lake City holds true across the country, that 
would mean approximately 32,500 wake-effect collisions occur every year. It 
should also be noted that these collisions could result from the passage of other 
emergency vehicles, such as police cares and fire trucks.  
 
 
 
 C. Effect on Patient Outcome 
 
 There have been relatively few studies on the use of lights and sirens’ 
effect on patient outcome. The subject can be further divided into two topics: the 
effect of the time saved when transporting patients with L&S, and the effect that 
emergency driving has on actual patient care.  
 A study conducted in New Jersey (mentioned earlier in this paper) aimed 
to find out both how much time was saved by transporting patients with lights and 
sirens, and whether the time saved positively effected the patient’s outcome. The 
authors found a mean time saved of 2.62 minutes, which was statistically 
significant, but probably did not provide any clinical benefits.22 The study divided 
interventions into those that could be performed by the paramedics (Prehospital 
Interventions) and those that could only be performed by a doctor upon arrival at 
the emergency department (Hospital Interventions) (Table 5).  
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Table 5. Prehospital and Hospital Interventions* 
 
 
*This table shows the difference between the interventions studied that can be 
performed during ambulance transports and those that can only be performed upon 
arrival to the emergency department.22 
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In addition to outlining the procedures that were recorded during the study, 
Table 5 also highlights the vast amount of interventions that can be performed by 
paramedics prior to arriving at the hospital. In this study, they outnumbered the 
hospital interventions almost six to one. 112 lights and sirens transports were 
analyzed for the study. Only 4.5% (5 patients) received hospital interventions 
upon arrival to the hospital. The mortality rate of these patients was 0%.22 None 
of the patients received the hospital interventions within the average 2.62 
minutes saved by lights and siren use. The authors concluded that the use of 
L&S was unnecessary for patients only requiring prehospital interventions (which 
accounted for 96.4% of the transports studied). They stated that more research 
was needed to even justify the use of lights and sirens for patients requiring 
hospital interventions.22 
The same group of authors then conducted another study in the same 
area based around implementation of a standardized protocol for the use of lights 
and sirens. Eight towns were studied, four of which adopted the protocol and four 
that were controls. The protocol outlined specific patient conditions that 
warranted the use of lights and sirens during transport (Table 6). The conditions 
were chosen based on the likelihood that a patient experiencing them would 
require hospital interventions and/or hospital admission.23 
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Table 6. Experimental Protocol for the Use of Lights and Sirens.* 
 
 
 
 *This table represents the protocol given to the experimental towns. It lists the 
patient conditions that the authors felt warranted emergency transport to the hospital. 
SBP: Systolic Blood Pressure, MI: Myocardial Infarction, NRB: Non-Rebreather Mask.23 
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The results showed a significant decrease in lights and sirens use in the 
experimental towns. 808 total patient transports were evaluated over the course 
of the study. Of the total 405 patients transported by the control towns, 201 were 
done so with lights and sirens (49.6%). The experimental towns transported 403 
total patients, 117 of which were transported with light and sirens (29%).23 The 
control towns were 5.6 times more likely to use lights and sirens than the 
experimental towns which implemented the protocol.23 
The study did not find any significant correlation between L&S use and 
hospital admissions in either the control or experimental towns. The authors did 
note that L&S use was more likely for patients that ended up requiring a trauma 
or intensive care unit activation.23 Interestingly, the study showed no decrease in 
the use of L&S by the control towns. The authors state that this indicates EMS 
providers will not change their driving behavior even when surrounding towns 
implement standardized protocols, suggesting that the only way for L&S use to 
decrease is for each EMS system to have its own protocols.23 The results also 
did not indicate any difference in patient outcome between the two groups.  
A study conducted in 1994 also implemented a L&S use protocol, with 
similar criteria to the one previously discussed. The authors then tracked all 
patient transports to determine if the protocol resulted in increased morbidity of 
patients transported with L&S. A total of 1,625 patients were transported during 
the study. 1,495 (92%) of patients were transported without the use of lights and 
sirens, 130 (8%) were transported with them.16 Following each transport, the 
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EMS providers completed a form and noted whether or not the patient’s condition 
had changed during transport. It was found that only 1% of the Non-L&S patients 
worsened during transport (Table 7).16 Accepting emergency room physicians 
reported that none of the patients who were listed as worsening during transport 
required any time-critical interventions upon arrival to the hospital.16 The authors 
reported that of the 92% of patients transported without L&S, almost half 
received Advanced Life Support (ALS) interventions during transport (indicating a 
relatively serious illness/injury) and many had very serious chief complaints, such 
as chest pain or respiratory distress.16 
 
 
Table 7. Changes in Patient Condition During Transport 
 
  L&S Non-L&S 
Expired 17 (13%) 0 (0%) 
Worsened 7 (5%) 13 (1%) 
Unchanged 84 (65%) 1324 (91%) 
Improved 22 (17%) 124 (8%) 
Total 130 1495 
 
 
 
*This table illustrates the differences between patient condition changes during 
L&S vs. Non-L&S transports. Only 1% of Non-L&S patients were listed as having 
worsened during transport. The table also shows that the patients transported with L&S 
were generally more seriously injured or ill, with 13% dying during transport and 5% 
worsening.16 
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 As previously stated, the protocol used in this study was similar to Table 6, 
including a list of various patient signs and symptoms that warranted expedited 
transport. The last criterion in the protocol used in this study gave providers a 
little room to make the decision to use L&S even for patients whose conditions 
did not fall under the established protocol. The criterion read: 
 
“Emergent transport should be used in any situation which the most 
highly trained EMS provider believes that the patient's condition could be 
worsened by delay equivalent to the time that could be gained by emergent 
transport. In all cases using this option, documentation of the reason for this on 
the trip must be recorded.” (Taken from Kupas, et. al. 1994).  
 
 
This criteria was cited was justification for 32% (40) of the 130 L&S 
transports. The authors suggest that removing this guideline from the protocol 
and using entirely objective (as opposed to subjective) criteria would most likely 
result in even fewer L&S transports. However, they note that it is essentially 
impossible to implement an entirely objective protocol that covers every single 
patient transported by ambulance.16 Over the course of the study, no patients 
were reported to have experienced increased morbidity due to non-L&S 
transport, and no EVCs occurred.16 
 Another important topic to consider is the direct effect of the aggressive 
driving that occurs during L&S transport on the patient’s health. A study 
conducted in Germany aimed to discover whether the stress of L&S transport 
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negatively impacted the health of a patient being transported. They subjected 54 
healthy volunteers to an ambulance ride with L&S and without L&S. Vitals signs 
and endocrine levels were measured after the completion of the rides. The 
subjects were found to have increases in heart rate, blood pressure, and multiple 
hormones (cortisol and ACTH, stress hormones) following the high-speed L&S 
ride.33 The authors stated that they believed this showed that the effects of an 
L&S transport, especially in patients with cardiac related complaints, could result 
in additional mortality.33 
 A study published in 2010 showed that increased speed and acceleration 
(as occurs during L&S driving) cause quality of CPR to become compromised. 
The study showed that depth of compressions and no-flow fraction (which 
represents the fraction of time that a pulseless patient is not receiving 
compressions, and is a critical marker for CPR success)27 increased as vehicle 
speed did (Figure 6).6 Although the increases appear small, the authors state 
they have very real negative impacts on the quality of CPR. These 
measurements were taken while providers administered CPR to a dummy in the 
back of the ambulance. The authors stated that they believed the increase in 
depth of compressions was a result of the release of catecholamines (in the 
providers) caused by the stress of transport, fast speeds, and use of L&S.6 
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Figure 6. No Flow Fraction and Compression Depth vs. Speed. The figure to 
the left represents the increase in no flow fraction (fraction of time a pulseless patient 
does not receive compressions) as speed increases. The figure on the right represents 
the increase in depth of chest compressions as speed increases.6 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
 
 
  
A thorough review of the literature on this subject published over the last 
few decades shows that the use of lights and sirens by ambulances is almost 
never necessary, negatively impacts patient care, and is a very real safety 
hazard both to EMS providers and the general public. All of the studies that 
aimed to research how much time was saved by the use of lights and sirens 
found that they do make a difference, although sometimes as little as 43 
seconds. One group of authors conducted two different studies, one in Greenville 
and one in Syracuse that had results quite different from each other (43 seconds 
saved in Greenville and 1 minute 46 seconds in Syracuse), even though the 
methods were essentially the same. One possibility for the large discrepancy is 
that Syracuse is a more urban environment than Greenville. While lights and 
sirens generally do not make a large difference over relatively long distances and 
open roads, their effectiveness is greatly enhanced when attempting to 
maneuver through heavy traffic, such as would be encountered in an urban 
environment. Another possibility is the difference between recording response 
and transport time. When providers are caring for a patient in the back of an 
ambulance, the driver generally takes great care to minimize unexpected stops, 
hard turns, and forceful accelerations so as to allow a more stable work 
environment. This is true even when using lights and sirens. However, in the 
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case of response time, there is no patient in the back, and the providers are free 
to drive more aggressively. This could very easily account for the increased time 
difference in the Syracuse study. However, virtually all of the studies also noted 
that the time saved was not clinically significant (and therefore unnecessary) in 
almost all patient transports.  
  
A. Improving Safety 
 
1. Protocols for Lights and Sirens Use 
 
 The first and most important way to decrease the hazards posed by  lights 
and sirens is to decrease their use. As previously noted, this is unlikely to happen 
without nation-wide implementation of protocols that outline when the use of L&S 
is appropriate. Some professional EMS services have implemented such 
protocols, but many services (especially smaller volunteer services) still leave 
L&S use up to the discretion of the driver. One study showed that a simple three-
tiered protocol for dispatching calls based on their severity could cut back on L&S 
use by one-third.14 
 Rescue, Inc. is a professional EMS company located in Southern Vermont 
that responds to around 5,000 calls for service each year. Rescue has a 
comprehensive lights and sirens protocol that results in many calls being 
responded to without the use of L&S, and almost no patient transports are done 
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in an emergency fashion. Rescue’s 911 calls are received at Brattleboro 
Dispatch in Brattleboro, VT, where the dispatchers are all trained in Emergency 
Medical Dispatching (EMD), and can therefore provide some direction to 
bystanders on the scene prior to EMS arrival. The dispatchers are also trained in 
Rescue’s L&S protocol, and are therefore able to determine whether their use will 
be appropriate based on information gathered from the 911 caller. When a call is 
dispatched to Rescue, it is coded as either Priority 1 ALS or Priority 2 BLS (Basic 
Life Support). Calls that are Priority 1 are responded to with the use of L&S, 
Priority 2 calls are not. Figure 7 illustrates how the coding is determined. Once on 
the scene, providers are advised to use their own discretion as to whether or not 
to transport with L&S, however, as previously stated, the use of L&S during 
patient transport is very rare, and is reserved for the most gravely ill patients. No 
adverse patient outcomes have been reported as a result of non-L&S transport. 
Rescue’s system shows that a combination of an established protocol along with 
thorough education of its providers on the appropriate use of L&S can prove an 
effective method for decreasing their use.  
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Figure 7. Rescue, Inc.’s L&S Protocol. This figure shows how calls are coded 
by severity based on the patient’s condition. It also serves as a guideline for determining 
which calls require the response of a Paramedic instead of EMTs. (Provided by Rescue, 
Inc. Brattleboro, VT).  
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In 2010 a collaborative “Best Practice Statement” was released by FEMA 
along with Firefighting, EMS, and Law Enforcement Unions in regards to 
emergency vehicle operations. The paper stated that in order to reduce the high 
number of fatalities sustained by emergency workers in transportation accidents, 
a “major cultural shift is required”. They also stated that emergency services 
need to realize that most of the calls they respond do not warrant the risk that 
utilizing L&S poses. The statement cited multiple fire departments that had 
implemented L&S policies, and showed that the St. Louis Fire Department had 
experienced over a 90% reduction in collisions within a few years of the policy 
being put in place.  
Another way that the use of lights and sirens can be reduced is through 
the expanded use of Termination of Resuscitation (TOR) protocols. These 
protocols only apply to a small subset of patients, those in cardiac arrest, and 
have been put into use over the last few years. TOR protocols indicate to 
providers when to stop attempting CPR on a patient based upon criteria that 
correlate with the chance the patient could actually be resuscitated. The 2010 
AHA guidelines provided a standardized TOR protocol (Figure 8), and estimated 
that following it could reduce unnecessary cardiac arrest transports by up 60%.24 
The AHA also states that “cessation of efforts in the out-of-hospital 
setting…should be standard practice”.24 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
   
 
 
 
Figure 8. Basic Life Support TOR Guidelines. This very basic and easy to 
follow flow chart provides guidelines for providers as to when it is appropriate to 
terminate CPR efforts prior to transporting a cardiac arrest patient. The AHA estimates 
that these guidelines can cut unnecessary transports by 60%.24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Ambulance Safety 
 
 
 Although the easiest way to decrease the risk that L&S use poses is to 
limit their use, it is impossible to discontinue their use completely, as they still 
have some limited utility for seriously injured or ill patients. Because of this it is 
important that ambulances are continually made to higher standards, so as to 
provide patients with a safe ride to the hospital and providers with a safe 
workspace. As was discussed earlier in this paper, the issue of seatbelt use in 
the rear compartment is paramount in lowering the risk of injury or death during 
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an EVC. Standard ambulance configuration of the patient compartment makes it 
very difficult for providers to remain restrained for the entirety of patient transport, 
especially when caring for critical patients.17 Recently, some ambulance 
manufacturers have begun offering a new seating arrangement in the patient 
compartment, replacing the traditional bench seat with a one person jump seat 
that slides along the length of the compartment, and usually includes a 5-point 
safety harness. The goal of this is to allow the provider maximum movement 
around the compartment while remaining restrained. Some manufacturers have 
even offered these seats with a short leash attached to the harness so that 
providers can stand to either access equipment and perform procedures without 
having to take the time to unbuckle and re-buckle. A comparison between the 
traditional setup and sliding seat approach is illustrate in Figure 9. A search of 
current literature produced no studies aimed at discovering whether this system 
helped to reduce serious injuries and fatalities.  
 Utilizing technology that allows providers to free-up their hands so that 
they can be used for stabilization also can greatly enhance crew safety. 
Automated ventilators and automated chest compressors are great machines 
that are gaining more popularity in EMS. Not only do they add to the safety of 
providers, they’ve also been shown to deliver much more consistent and higher 
quality care to patients than manual ventilations or CPR. One study showed that 
using an automated compressor can improve compression effectiveness from 0-
33% (when done manually) to 88-100% during highway travel.32 
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 Several papers also discussed the benefit of simply reorganizing the 
interior storage of the rear compartment so that the most often used items are 
within arms reach of seated, restrained provider. Another often mentioned 
technology was radio headsets, usually utilized by medical helicopter crews. The 
idea behind ground crews using them is that it again frees up their hands by not 
requiring them to reach for and hold a radio microphone.31 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Traditional 
Bench Seat Design vs. Sliding 
Seat with Harness. The top 
picture represents that traditional 
ambulance patient compartment 
design, featuring a bench seat with 
only lap-style seat belts, which 
provide minimal protection and 
require the provider to unbuckle to 
move around at all. The lower 
picture shows a new approach to 
ambulance design, featuring a 
sliding seat in place of the bench, 
allowing the provider to be safely 
restrained using a five-point 
harness, and still be able to 
access all points on the patient. 
(Top photo taken from 
www.flickr.com, Bottom photo 
taken from www.EMSworld.com). 
 
 
42 
   3. Driver Behavior 
 
 Improving driver behavior was discussed by multiple papers as an 
effective solution to EVCs. Recall the earlier discussed study in which 71% of all 
EVCs reviewed over an eight year period involved an ambulance driven by an 
EMT with a history of prior EVCs.10 
 On-board computers that monitor driver performance and provide 
feedback have been discussed as a solution to poor driver behavior. The units 
are installed in the ambulance, and function somewhat like the “black box” on 
airplanes. When a driver enters the vehicle, he or she plugs in a key fob that is 
uniquely tied to them, and they are then registered as the driver of the run. The 
computer then logs all aspects of the trip: miles traveled, speeds, acceleration, 
G-forces, even seatbelt use. Limits can also be set for things like speed or G-
forces, and when they are exceeded an audible warning sounds in the cab to 
alert the driver that he or she needs to slow down.  
 A study was published in 2005 that aimed to discover the effectiveness of 
the implementation of these devices into an EMS company’s fleet. The devices 
were installed in March 2003, and until mid-April 2003 they only collected data 
and did not have any audible warnings. Starting in mid-April the audible tones 
were turned on, and in June 2003 the key fob identification devices were utilized. 
The study ran for a total of 18 months. The results were quite impressive, and 
are summarized in Figure 10.  
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A. 
 
 
 
B. 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 10. (A) Total Number of Seatbelt Violations by Month. This chart 
shows the number of seatbelt violations collected by the on-board computer over the 
length of the study. (B) Total Number of Speed Violations by Month. This chart shows 
the total number of speed violations collected by the on-board computer over the length 
of the study.20 
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 The results shown in Figure 10 provide very good evidence that the 
computer system improves driver safety immensely. The authors hypothesized 
that the initial spike in violations in April was probably indicative of the true 
baseline for the company that was studied. They state that after learning the 
system would be implemented in March, providers most likely attempted to drive 
safer, but as time went on they stopped worry about it as much.20 However, once 
the audible alerts were turned on in April, the number of violations dropped quite 
a bit. The violations finally dropped all the way down once the identification 
system began being used in June. There are two slight increases in violations, 
October 2003 and March 2004. The authors stated that they were caused by one 
driver who was identified as performing poorly and reassigned, and by 
mechanics who drove the ambulances during maintenance, respectively.20 
Seatbelt violations were reduced from 13,500 per month to only four, a 3,375 fold 
decrease. The EMS company also noted a 20% decrease in maintenance 
costs.20 
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V. FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
A major theme among currently published papers on this subject is that 
they all state that additional research is needed to further define the necessity of 
lights and sirens. Most studies were retrospective, which is not ideal, but is really 
the only way to study the subject. It would be impossible to duplicate ambulance 
calls with the same patient, chief complaint, weather, and traffic conditions to see 
if the time saved by using L&S had any effect on the patient. While current 
research has essentially definitely proven that L&S use is mostly unnecessary, 
further research is needed into improving ambulance safety and design.  
 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 This paper began as a review of current literature on the use of lights and 
sirens of ambulances, but evolved into much more. During the research it 
became apparent that although the actual use of lights and sirens was the major 
issue contributing to ambulance crash fatalities and injuries, other things such as 
ambulance design and driver behavior played a big role. Research dating back to 
the 1980’s has shown that the use of lights and sirens is unnecessary and 
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dangerous to providers and the public alike, yet very little reform has been put in 
place to attempt to limit their use. EMS systems that have implemented 
strategies decrease their use and increase safety with dramatically positive 
results, and without any negative effect on their patients. This is certainly due in 
part to the resistance of providers to leave behind this practice which has 
become a tradition in the emergency services. As Jeff Clawson puts it in his 
passionately-written article against L&S use: “The concept of reducing lights and 
siren use is just slightly more popular in our nation’s fire and ambulance services 
than gun control is with the National Rifle Association”.8 EMS Medical Directors, 
company administrators, chiefs, and providers across the country need to take a 
hard look at the evidence against L&S use, and come to the realization that it is a 
practice rooted not in science, but tradition. The men and women in the 
emergency medical services got into their careers because they wanted to help 
those around them, yet every time they transport a patient with a mild illness in 
an emergency fashion, they are putting themselves and those around them in 
dire risk. It is time for EMS providers to become more responsible with their 
driving habits, and remember that the biggest rule in medicine is to “First, do no 
harm”. 
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